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THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISION IN
BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTIONS AGAINST
THE CITY OF NEW YORK
Steven Isaacs and Mathew Paulose Jr.*
This article addresses a little known provision in the Adminis-
trative Code called section 7-201(a) that requires service of a notice
of claim prior to commencement of a contract action against the
City of New York.  Practitioners who have failed to take note of the
provision have had their cases dismissed, some in which more than
half a million dollars were in dispute.  This article also offers some
suggestions for practitioners faced with a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment for failure to follow the provision’s
mandate.
THE PROVISION
Section 7-201(a) of the New York City Administrative Code
provides, in relevant part, that in “every action” against the City of
New York the complaint must contain an allegation that at least
thirty days has elapsed since a “demand, claim, or claims” were
presented to the comptroller and that the comptroller failed to
make an “adjustment or payment” of or for such “demand, claim,
or claims” within the elapsed thirty days.1  Section 7-201(a) does
not define the words “every action,” “demand, claim, or claims,” or
“adjustment or payment.”  Relevant case law reveals that the words,
“demand, claim, or claims,” mean a “notice of claim”2 and the
words, “adjustment or payment,” mean “settlement.”3  With respect
to the words, “every action,” case law initially suggests that the
* Steven Isaacs is a partner and Mathew Paulose Jr. is an associate at Koehler and
Isaacs LLP; David A. Drossman, a former Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City
of New York consulted on the article.
1 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 7-201(a) (2001).
2 See PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 96-C5014, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15006, at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1996) (referring to § 7-201 as “notice of claim”
provision).  This is debatable, however. Compare N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813(1) (2001)
(using words “written verified claim”) with N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813(2) (using words
“notice of claim”).
3 See PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15006,
at 11 (referring to § 7-201 as provision allowing N.Y.C. Comptroller’s Office to “inves-
tigate and, if appropriate, to settle” claims before commencement of litigation).
1
2 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1
words are intended to make the statute “all encompassing.”4  How-
ever, closer inspection reveals that the statute is actually intended
to be only applicable to those actions involving monetary relief or
to those actions involving both equitable and monetary relief
where the equitable relief is only incidental to the monetary relief.5
Further inspection reveals that the statute is also intended to be
only applicable to those actions involving causes of action other
than tort.6  Taking all these definitions into consideration then,
section 7-201(a) really means that in every non-tort action against
the City of New York seeking mainly monetary relief, a notice of
claim must be filed with the comptroller before commencement of
the action.
THE PURPOSE
The purpose behind the section is somewhat similar to the
purpose behind the other notice of claim provisions applicable to
actions against the City of New York, two of the best-known provi-
sions being Section 50-i of the New York General Municipal Law
and Section 3813 of the New York Education Law.7  Section 50-i
provides that in every tort action against a city, county, town, village
fire district or school district a notice of claim must be filed and
served upon the defendant prior to the commencement of an ac-
tion.8  Section 3813 requires that in every action against a school
district, board of education, board of cooperative educational ser-
vices or school a notice of claim must be filed within three months
after the accrual of a claim and be presented to the governing body
of a school district or school prior to the commencement of an
action.9
According to the New York Court of Appeals the purpose of
these notice of claim provisions is to:
allow municipal defendants to conduct an investigation and ex-
4 See Arol Development Corp. v. City of New York, 59 A.D.2d 883, 884 (1st Dept.
1977) (discussing § 394a-1.0, predecessor of § 7-201).
5 See Kaselaan & D’Angelo Associates, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 98-C7497, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18133, at 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Brooklyn School for Special Children v.
Crew, No. 96-C5014, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12974, at 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). But see
Clempner v. Town of Southold, 546 N.Y.S.2d 101, 105 (2d Dept. 1989).
6 See Ferrara v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. City Ct. Bronx County
1946) (§ 7-201(a) superseded by N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e, applicable to tort ac-
tions against City of New York).
7 See PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15006,
at 8 (comparing § 7-201 with §§ 50-i and 3813).
8 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-I (1999).
9 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813(1) (2001).
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amine the plaintiff with respect to the claim, and to determine
whether the claims should be adjusted or satisfied before the
parties are subjected to the expense of litigation.10
The provisions are also intended to give “prompt notice of claims
so that the investigation may be made before it is too late for inves-
tigation to be efficient.”11  Generally, these principles can be more
succinctly stated as the principles of investigation, settlement, and
freshness.
Courts have found these underlying principles applicable to
section 7-201(a), but not entirely.  While they have found the prin-
ciples of investigation and settlement applicable to section 7-
201(a), the courts have not found the principles of freshness appli-
cable.12  Apparently, this is because section 7-201(a) does not pre-
scribe a time limit in which an individual must file a notice of
claim.13  Section 50-i, for instance, prescribes a 90-day time limit.14
Section 3813 prescribes a three-month time limit.15  Section 7-
201(a), on the other hand, prescribes no time limit.16  As one fed-
eral court sitting in New York accurately analyzed:
It may be assumed, therefore, that the policy consideration be-
hind § 7-201 is to provide for a period during which a settle-
ment may be negotiated without having to resort to litigation,
rather than to preserve the freshness of claims by notification
soon after the claim arises.17
Despite the loss of this particular principle, courts readily dis-
miss actions that fail to respect the primary principles of investiga-
tion and settlement for which notice of claim provisions are so
strictly enforced.18  Any court failing to strictly enforce the provi-
sions would be in essence failing to enforce the doctrine of stare
10 Davidson v. Bronx Mun. Hosp., 64 N.Y.2d 59 (1984) (addressing N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 50-h).
11 Parochial Bus Systems, Inc. v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 539,
547 (1983) (addressing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813).
12 See, e.g., American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Human Re-
sources, 736 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
13 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 7-201(a) (2001).
14 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §50-I(1)(c)(1999).
15 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §3813(1) (2001).
16 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §7-201(a) (2001).
17 See, e.g., American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Human Re-
sources, 736 F. Supp. 496, 499.
18 See, e.g., PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15006 at 9 (citing Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 265 (N.Y.
1969)). See Kaselaan & D’Angelo Associates, Inc. v. City of New York, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18133 at 5 (citing Davidson, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 535); Chateau D’If Corp. v. City of
New York, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8001 at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1990); American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. v. N.Y.C., 736 F. Supp. 496, 499.
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decisis – unacceptable in the judicial decision-making process.
Thus, when faced with a motion to dismiss for the failure to file a
notice of claim, courts may consider not dismissing the underlying
action only after strictly observing whether the principles of investi-
gation and settlement are indeed inapplicable or satisfied through
other means.  Accordingly, in the eyes of the practitioner, notice of
claim provisions have become essential in actions against a
municipality.
THE HISTORY
Section 7-201(a) derives its heritage from the New York City
Charter of 1860.  The language used then is nearly identical to the
language used today.19  The charter was subsequently amended in
1873, 1882, 1896, and 1897, but the language of section 7-201(a)
remained relatively the same.20  In 1901, section 7-201(a), which
was then called section 261, was found in the Revised Charter of
the City of New York and read as follows:
No action or special proceeding for any cause whatever shall be
prosecuted or maintained against The City of New York unless it
shall appear by and as an allegation in the complaint or neces-
sary moving papers that at least thirty days have elapsed since
the demand, claim or claims upon which such action or special
proceeding is founded were presented to the comptroller of
said city for adjustment and that he has neglected or refused to
make an adjustment or payment thereof for thirty days after
such presentment.21
Noticeably, for the exception of some reordering and changes
in the words “for any cause whatever” to “every action,” the lan-
guage is identical to the language found in the present version of
section 7-201(a).  In 1937, the section was renamed and relocated
to section 394a-1.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New
York.22  In 1980, the section was renamed and rearranged once
more to its current cognomen and form.23
During this long era, relevant case law reveals that the underly-
ing principles of section 7-201(a) have always been investigation
19 See Bernreither v. City of New York, 123 A.D. 291, 292-93 (1st Dept. 1908).
20 See id. at 292-93 (listing history of section 261 of Revised Charter (City of New
York) (Laws of 1901, ch. 466)).
21 Id. at 292 (quoting Revised Charter).
22 See Holmes v. City of New York, 269 A.D. 95, 100 (2d Dept 1945) (dissent men-
tioning Laws of 1937, ch. 929).
23 See Termine v. City of New York, 139 Misc. 2d 672, 674 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings
County 1988).
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and settlement.  This is no more clearly seen than in the 1903 case
of Smith v. City of New York,24 where the court stated:
The object sought to be accomplished by this provision of the
charter is to give an opportunity to the comptroller to examine
the validity of the claim presented, and if valid, to adjust and pay
the same, in order to avoid the expenses of litigation.25
Other cases further illustrate these principles such as in the 1908
case of Bernreither v. City of New York,26 where the court noted that
one of the objectives of section 7-201(a) was to give authorities
time to investigate and, if the claim was good, pay without the ne-
cessity of a lawsuit.27
Over the years, this precedent evolved into stricter wording,
culminating in the following statement by Justice Cardozo:
The Legislature has said that a particular form of notice, con-
veyed with particular details to particular public officers, shall be
a prerequisite to the right to sue.  The courts are without power
to substitute something else.28
This language is cited regularly in judicial decisions dismissing
an action for the failure to file a notice of claim.29  Thus, it has
come to a general understanding that section 7-201(a) must be
strictly enforced.  Its history is long and its precedent unyielding.
RECTIFYING THE FAILURE TO FILE A SECTION 7-201(A)
NOTICE OF CLAIM
There is no statutory relief for the failure to file a notice of
claim in a monetary non-tort action against the City of New York.
This is because, unlike the other notice of claim provisions applica-
ble to actions against the City of New York, section 7-201(a) does
not provide a statutory mechanism for seeking leave to file a late
notice of claim.  Section 50-e (5), for example, provides that leave
to file a late notice of claim may be allowed if it can be proven that
notwithstanding the absence of a timely notice of claim the City of
New York acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts consti-
24 Smith v. City of New York, 88 A.D. 606, 608 (1st Dept 1903) (discussing section
261 of Greater New York charter (City of New York) (Laws of 1897, ch. 378)).
25 Id. at 608.
26 Bernreither v. City of New York, 123 A.D. 291 (1st Dept 1908) (discussing sec-
tion 261).
27 Id. at 292- 93.
28 Thomann v. City of Rochester, 256 N.Y. 165, 172 (1931), cited in PBS Building
Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15006, at 9.
29 See, e.g., PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15006, at 9.
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tuting the claim within the applicable time period.30  Similarly, sec-
tion 3813(2-a) provides that leave may be allowed if it can be
proven that the school district acquired actual knowledge of the
essential facts constituting the claim.31  The legislature specifically
enacted these exceptions to the general notice of claim require-
ments in actions for tort against a municipality and for any action
against a school district to relieve the harshness of abrupt dismis-
sals.32  But the legislature failed to enact a similar exception under
section 7-201(a).  Thus, because of this failure, it can only be inter-
preted that there is no exception to the failure to file a section 7-
201(a) notice of claim.  Any non-tort monetary action against the
City of New York commenced without a section 7-201(a) notice of
claim must be dismissed without exception.
There is, however, some potential of relief as section 7-201(a)
does not require a specific form of notice of claim.  For example,
section 50-i requires a written notice of claim specifying rather par-
ticular details.33  In contrast, section 7-201(a) does not expressly
require a written demand.  Therefore, it can be interpreted that
the section merely requires a demand, either oral or written, artic-
ulating the essential facts constituting a monetary claim.  This rule
provides relief against a motion to dismiss or for summary judg-
ment for the failure to file a formal section 7-201(a) notice of
claim.
In Kaselaan & D’Angelo Associates v. City of New York,34 the plain-
tiff was faced with a motion for summary judgment for the failure
to file a section 7-201(a) notice of claim.  The underlying action
entailed a breach of contract claim for payment of overdue interest
from the Human Resources Administration Agency of the City of
New York (“HRA”) for work done at various New York City day care
centers.  The plaintiff had by letter and invoice notified the Gen-
eral Counsel of HRA that it was making a demand for the payment
of overdue interest.  During the summary judgment motion, the
plaintiff seized upon these communications and argued that sec-
tion’s mandate for a notice of claim had been satisfied.  The court
acknowledged the argument.  After first recognizing that notice of
30 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (5) (1999) (application for leave to file late
notice of claim).
31 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3813(2-a) (application for leave to file late notice of
claim in tort actions only).
32 See generally Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950 (1982).
33 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (2) (2001) (form of notice of claims).
34 Kaselaan & D’Angelo Associates v. City of New York, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18133, at 8.
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claim requirements are strictly enforced, the court stated that
“[f]iling of a formal notice of claim may be excused . . . [when] . . .
the defendant has ‘received clear notice’ “of the nature of the
claims, and . . . [the] . . . time . . . place . . . and manner in which
the claims arose.”35  In the instant case, while the invoice and possi-
bly the letter were measured to give sufficient notice, they had
been provided to the wrong official, the general counsel of HRA,
rather than to the Comptroller of the City of New York, as ex-
pressly mandated by section 7-201(a).  Accordingly, the court was
left with no other recourse but to dismiss the action.36
In PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York,37 the plaintiff
was similarly faced with a motion for summary judgment for the
failure to file a section 7-201(a) notice of claim.  The underlying
action entailed a breach of contract claim for payment of approxi-
mately half a million dollars from the Department of General Ser-
vices of the City of New York (“DGS”) for the design and
construction of four buildings on Rikers Island.  Plaintiff had, as
mandated by the contract between plaintiff and DGS, submitted
several notices of claim to DGS regarding payments due which
DGS had or should have had forwarded to the Comptroller’s Of-
fice.  On defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
argued, as did the plaintiff in Kaselaan, that section 7-201(a)’s no-
tice of claim mandate had been satisfied.  Again, the court ac-
knowledged that the argument had some merit.  After first
recognizing that a failure to file a statutory notice of claim required
outright dismissal of the underlying action, the court credited
plaintiff’s argument that a contractual notice of claim, as opposed
to a statutory notice of claim, could have met section 7-201(a)’s
mandate.  But, in this particular case, the statutory notice of claim
failed to sufficiently indicate the plaintiff’s intention to litigate stat-
utory claims as a formal notice of claim would have done.  This
conclusion was derived from an affidavit written by the Comptrol-
ler provided in support of the defendant’s motion.  In the affidavit,
the Comptroller affirmed that the demands made in the contrac-
tual notices of claim did not give the Comptroller notice that plain-
tiff intended to litigate the demand as would have a formal notice
of claim.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the action.38
These cases demonstrate that when faced with a motion to dis-
35 Id. at  5-6.
36 Id. at  6-7.
37 PBS Building Systems, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15006, at
9.
38 Id. at 13-15.
8 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1
miss or for summary judgment for failure to file a formal section 7-
201(a) notice of claim, the first relief to seek should be whether
any non-formal notices were provided.  If so, it should then be de-
termined whether the non-formal notice was given to the proper
public official, the Comptroller, and if it sufficiently gave notice of
an intent to litigate.  In contract cases, invoices for amounts due
should be found.  This is because invoices by nature provide a de-
tail equivalent to that found in a formal notice of claim: the nature
of the claim, and the time, place and the manner in which the
claim arose.39  Invoices also by nature provide notice of an intent
to litigate: the failure to pay an invoice amount ordinarily results in
litigation for the invoice amount due.  The principal concern with
invoices is that they are customarily not forwarded to the Comp-
troller’s Office.  Therefore, as general practice, concerned persons
or businesses doing contract business with the City of New York
should forward copies of invoices to the Comptroller contempora-
neously with copies to the related city agency or entity responsible
for payment of the invoices.
OTHER OPTIONS
There are two other options to consider when faced with a
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment for the failure to file a
formal section 7-201(a) notice of claim.  As stated earlier, section 7-
201(a) applies only to those actions involving monetary relief or to
those actions involving both equitable and monetary relief where
the equitable relief is only incidental to the monetary relief.
Therefore, it may be worthwhile to amend the underlying com-
plaint to allege equitable rather than monetary relief.  In Brooklyn
School for Special Children v. Crew,40 plaintiffs had brought an ac-
tion claiming more than five million dollars due on a memoran-
dum of understanding.  When faced with a motion for judgment
on the pleadings for the failure to file a section 7-201(a) notice of
claim, the plaintiffs pointed out that the underlying action was pri-
marily for declaratory and injunctive relief and the monetary relief
was ancillary at best.  The court took notice and denied the mo-
tion, finding that since notice of claims did not apply to actions
seeking equitable relief, the section 7-201(a) notice of claim did
39 See, e.g., Hygrade Insulators, Inc. v. Middle Country Central School District, 207
A.D.2d 430, 431 (2d Dept. 1994) (finding invoice sufficiently similar to notice of
claim).
40 Brooklyn School for Special Children v. Crew, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12974, at 1.
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not apply.41
The other option is to amend the underlying complaint to al-
lege a federal claim, rather than a state claim.  As already evident,
section 7-201(a) is a municipal statute and, generally speaking,
only applies to common law causes of action.  In American Telephone
and Telegraph Co. v. City of New York,42 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion claiming more than half a million dollars due under a con-
tract for telephone services.  When faced with a motion to dismiss
for the failure to file a section 7-201(a) notice of claim, the plain-
tiffs pointed out that the underlying action was brought pursuant
to the Federal Communications Act (FCA), a federal statute and,
therefore, the state code section 7-201 was inapplicable.  The court
agreed, finding that the requirement of state notice was not neces-
sary.  As a result, the court denied the defendant’s motion.43
These two options provide some potential relief when defend-
ing a motion to dismiss for failure to file a section 7-201(a) notice
of claim.  According to case law, however, these options are rarely
available.  Thus, while there is some relief from section 7-201(a)’s
underlying principles and strict interpretation, the section’s strict
requirements should be complied with at all times as it maintains
its historical gospel-like reputation.
41 Id. at 51.
42 American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of New York, 736 F. Supp. 496.
43 Id. at 500-02.

